Frege’s Puzzle: Can we pose it on Frege’s Behalf?

 

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Autor: Ruffino, Marco
Formato: artículo original
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de Publicación:2015
Descripción:In this paper I first review the main elements of the so-called Frege’s Puzzle, and argue that there is something odd in the argument that Frege builds based on it: Frege first rejects a possible hypothesis for the nature of identity in order to make plausible the distinction between sense and reference. But, after the distinction is made, the rejected hypothesis is the only one compatible with it after all. Next, I discuss Glezakos’ (2009) position regarding the Puzzle. I argue that, although she does point out something quite important, we do not have to accept her conclusion that there is no puzzle that can be formulated in neutral terms.
País:Portal de Revistas UCR
Institución:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UCR
Lenguaje:Inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21315
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21315
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:frege’s puzzle
identity
cognitive value
names
demonstratives
puzzle de frege
identidad
valor cognitivo
nombres
demostrativos