La Fenomenología como realismo real
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| Tác giả: | |
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| Định dạng: | artículo original |
| Trạng thái: | Versión publicada |
| Ngày xuất bản: | 2020 |
| Miêu tả: | The aim of this paper is to explore Zahavi’s arguments for a Realistic Phenomenology. I claim that by relating Husserl and Putnam, Zahavi manages to formulate a Husserlian version of realism, which is, however, incapable of responding to the critiques from Speculative Realism. In order to this, I reconstruct the argument directed by Speculative Realism against Phenomenology of being Anti-realistic. Then, I present Zahavi’s response, and especially how he uses Putnam’s realism. Finally, I make some criticisms to Putnam’s view about Realism and argue that these criticisms can undermine the real realism with which Zahavi pretends to exonerate Husserl from Anti-realism. |
| Quốc gia: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Tổ chức giáo dục: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/39717 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/39717 |
| Từ khóa: | Antirrealismo Correlacionismo Fenomenología Realismo Zahavi Anti-realism Correlationism Phenomenology Realism |