Do U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of California
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| লেখক: | , |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | artículo original |
| প্রকাশনার তারিখ: | 2004 |
| বিবরন: | This review tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. It analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry and the authority granted to a board of producers by the almond marketing order would seem to be conducive to profit-maximizing cartel behavior. Nevertheless, the authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel. |
| দেশ: | Kérwá |
| প্রতিষ্ঠান: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Kérwá |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:kerwa.ucr.ac.cr:10669/75342 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/agr.10081 https://hdl.handle.net/10669/75342 |
| মুখ্য শব্দ: | Cartel Market power Marketing orders Price leadership Trade |