Do U.S. marketing orders have much market power? An examination of the Almond Board of California
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Συγγραφείς: | , |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2004 |
| Περιγραφή: | This review tests the conventional wisdom that U.S. marketing orders act as profit-maximizing cartels. It analyzes the marketing order for U.S. almonds in both the domestic and export markets. Such a case study is relevant to all U.S. marketing orders because the size and scope of the U.S. almond industry and the authority granted to a board of producers by the almond marketing order would seem to be conducive to profit-maximizing cartel behavior. Nevertheless, the authors find that the market power exerted by the Almond Board of California is significantly less than would be expected from a profit-maximizing cartel. |
| Χώρα: | Kérwá |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Kérwá |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:kerwa.ucr.ac.cr:10669/75342 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/agr.10081 https://hdl.handle.net/10669/75342 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | Cartel Market power Marketing orders Price leadership Trade |