The Best Laid Schemes ... Gang Aft A-gley: Judicial Reform in Latin America – Evidence from Costa Rica

 

Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Συγγραφείς: Wilson, Bruce M., Rodríguez Cordero, Juan Carlos, Handberg, Roger
Μορφή: artículo original
Ημερομηνία έκδοσης:2004
Περιγραφή:Starting in the 1980s, and accelerating through the 1990s, international financial institutions (IFIs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development agencies funnelled considerable resources into judicial reform and rule of law programmes in virtually every Latin American and Caribbean country. The assumption was that reformed court systems would foster free market economic development strategies. This article examines the impact of two frequently advocated aspects of judicial reform, judicial access and judicial independence, on economic policy making in Costa Rica. We argue that there is a potentially significant disjuncture between the sponsors' expectations of the judicial reforms' economic impact and the observed outcomes.
Χώρα:Kérwá
Ίδρυμα:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Kérwá
OAI Identifier:oai:kerwa.ucr.ac.cr:10669/73857
Διαθέσιμο Online:https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/the-best-laid-schemes-gang-aft-a-gley-judicial-reform-in-latin-america-evidence-from-costa-rica/D3D74BE61CE00F526A741C38E29BEB4C
https://hdl.handle.net/10669/73857
Λέξη-Κλειδί :Costa Rica
Reforma Judicial
Instituciones Financieras Internacionales
Corte Suprema de Justicia
Sala Constitucional