Recognizing the Referent
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2015 |
| Περιγραφή: | In this article I show that in a trivial way, as Glezakos holds, there is no puzzle. However, this is the case only when no theoretical assumptions are made. I argue that the puzzle can be posed independently of the sense/reference distinction by trying to answer a theoretical question about the relation between the meaning and the epistemic profiles of identity statements. Contrary to Glezakos I claim that it is possible to attach different epistemic profiles to each identity schema. As I read the puzzle it may be a problem for those who hold that meaning is explained by reference and accept the epistemic profiles of the two schemas. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Γλώσσα: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21318 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21318 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | sense reference epistemic profile meaning recognition sentido referencia perfil epistémico significado reconocimiento |