The Fundamental Kantian Aporia

 

Gorde:
Xehetasun bibliografikoak
Egilea: Moya Bedoya, Juan Diego
Formatua: artículo original
Egoera:Versión publicada
Argitaratze data:2025
Deskribapena:My paper regards a Kantian dilemma: either we omit the claim that (p) there are things in itself, because we must omit every assertion without epistemic justification, or we omit the claim, essential from the point of view of the Kantian theory of categories, that (q) categories only have cognitive significance if they inform phenomena (at least one phenomenon). P places Immanuel Kant outside from ontological realism; q places Kant, outside from empiricism. But Kantian epistemology is a realistic empiricism. Therefore, this dilemma poses Immanuel Kant out of Kantianism, that is, it compels Kant to give up Kantian epistemology. 
Herria:Portal de Revistas UCR
Erakundea:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UCR
Hizkuntza:Español
OAI Identifier:oai:portal.revistas.ucr.ac.cr:article/1573
Sarrera elektronikoa:https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/rfilosofia/article/view/1573
Gako-hitza:Category
Consistency
Thing in itself
Form
kantian
trascendental
categoría
Consistencia
cosa en sí
forma
kantiano