El concepto de persona en leibniz

 

Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
Manylion Llyfryddiaeth
Awdur: Amengual, Gabriel
Fformat: artículo original
Statws:Versión publicada
Dyddiad Cyhoeddi:2014
Disgrifiad:While Locke’s concept of the person constitutes a milestone because it is now defined as consciousness, Leibniz claims for a substantial dimension without renouncing to the conscious dimension in man. In this way, Leibniz accomplishes a synthesis between substantiality and consciousness in the same singular level where a proper notion of person can be found.
Gwlad:Portal de Revistas UCR
Sefydliad:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UCR
Iaith:Español
OAI Identifier:oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/13144
Mynediad Ar-lein:https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/13144
Allweddair:person
identity
consciousness
soul
corporality
persona
identidad
conciencia
alma
corporalidad