THE SUITABILITY OF THE CONCEPT OF BIRTH AS THE SOLE DIFFERENTIATING CRITERION BETWEEN THE CRIMINAL TYPES OF ABORTION AND MURDER, AN ANALYSIS OF SENTENCES OF THE THIRD CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Awdur: | |
|---|---|
| Fformat: | artículo original |
| Statws: | Versión publicada |
| Dyddiad Cyhoeddi: | 2023 |
| Disgrifiad: | The beginning of human life is a transcendental issue that allows regulating when the human being is a subject of legal protection in our legal system, because there are various theses that value the beginning of human life differently and therefore the notion of person. The intention of this text is not only to show the dominant position of our Third Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, but to determine if birth as a differentiating criterion is enough to clarify the obscures that revolve around the issue: when the product of pregnancy dies inside the uterus; define it was a fetus o well a person protected by the criminal offense of homicide. |
| Gwlad: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Sefydliad: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Iaith: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/57397 |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/RDMCP/article/view/57397 |