Kant, Meillassoux, and the Mathematical Properties of Objects
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Awduron: | , |
|---|---|
| Fformat: | artículo original |
| Statws: | Versión publicada |
| Dyddiad Cyhoeddi: | 2025 |
| Disgrifiad: | This paper points out a limitation of Meillassoux’s speculative realism objections against Kant’s transcendental idealism. More specifically, it explains why access to things in themselves via mathematical knowledge is not feasible. To clarify this, the notion of quantity is examined, specifying the sensible and intellectual determination of all mathematical knowledge, which means it can only refer to objects of possible experience for us. |
| Gwlad: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Sefydliad: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Iaith: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/62025 |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/62025 |
| Allweddair: | Idealismo trascendental realismo especulativo cosa en sí experiencia cantidad Trascendental Idealism Speculative Realism Things in Themselves Experience Quantity |