Kant, Meillassoux, and the Mathematical Properties of Objects
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Συγγραφείς: | , |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2025 |
| Περιγραφή: | This paper points out a limitation of Meillassoux’s speculative realism objections against Kant’s transcendental idealism. More specifically, it explains why access to things in themselves via mathematical knowledge is not feasible. To clarify this, the notion of quantity is examined, specifying the sensible and intellectual determination of all mathematical knowledge, which means it can only refer to objects of possible experience for us. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Γλώσσα: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/62025 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/62025 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | Idealismo trascendental realismo especulativo cosa en sí experiencia cantidad Trascendental Idealism Speculative Realism Things in Themselves Experience Quantity |