Kant, Meillassoux, and the Mathematical Properties of Objects
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| Nhiều tác giả: | , |
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| Định dạng: | artículo original |
| Trạng thái: | Versión publicada |
| Ngày xuất bản: | 2025 |
| Miêu tả: | This paper points out a limitation of Meillassoux’s speculative realism objections against Kant’s transcendental idealism. More specifically, it explains why access to things in themselves via mathematical knowledge is not feasible. To clarify this, the notion of quantity is examined, specifying the sensible and intellectual determination of all mathematical knowledge, which means it can only refer to objects of possible experience for us. |
| Quốc gia: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Tổ chức giáo dục: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/62025 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/62025 |
| Từ khóa: | Idealismo trascendental realismo especulativo cosa en sí experiencia cantidad Trascendental Idealism Speculative Realism Things in Themselves Experience Quantity |