The Argument from Marginal Cases: Moral Degradation or Ableist Bias?
Guardado en:
| Údar: | |
|---|---|
| Formáid: | artículo original |
| Stádas: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2025 |
| Cur Síos: | According to Peter Singer’s perspective, there are marginal human beings. However, the alleged marginality in this argument arises from positioning disabled individuals within a hierarchy of cognitive abilities, under the pretext of the capacities they lack. This is what I seek to challenge by questioning the notion of marginality in the argument, which frames disability as misfortune. To do so, I review some of the most significant critiques of the argument of marginal cases and propose an approach rooted in critical disability studies, through the lens of «ableist bias» |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institiúid: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Teanga: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/61518 |
| Rochtain Ar Líne: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/61518 |
| Palabra clave: | argumento de los casos marginales etica animal capacitismo discapacidad argument from marginal cases animal ethics ableism disability |