Frege’s Puzzle: Can we pose it on Frege’s Behalf?
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2015 |
| Περιγραφή: | In this paper I first review the main elements of the so-called Frege’s Puzzle, and argue that there is something odd in the argument that Frege builds based on it: Frege first rejects a possible hypothesis for the nature of identity in order to make plausible the distinction between sense and reference. But, after the distinction is made, the rejected hypothesis is the only one compatible with it after all. Next, I discuss Glezakos’ (2009) position regarding the Puzzle. I argue that, although she does point out something quite important, we do not have to accept her conclusion that there is no puzzle that can be formulated in neutral terms. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Γλώσσα: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21315 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21315 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | frege’s puzzle identity cognitive value names demonstratives puzzle de frege identidad valor cognitivo nombres demostrativos |