GAME OF REGIMES: A GAME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODERN CONTRACTUAL STATE
保存先:
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| フォーマット: | artículo original |
| 状態: | Versión publicada |
| 出版日付: | 2021 |
| その他の書誌記述: | This article argues that democracy, as well as non-democratic regimes, share hierarchies as models of governance (conflict resolution mechanisms) in the process of building a modern contractual state. Game theory is used as a methodology to analyze the works of Hobbes and Machiavelli, defending that both proposals describe the same phenomenon but at different stages, with the objective of contributing to the explanation of the current crisis of democracy. To this end, a new model that integrates Von Neumann’s expectedutility function with a variant of Selten’s discount rate to refine equilibria, is developed. It is concluded that it is not the governance model, but the efficiency of the State to manage the conflict that determines the consolidation (or dismantling) of the contractual regime. |
| 国: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| 機関: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| 言語: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/45489 |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/sociales/article/view/45489 |
| キーワード: | POLITICAL THEORY POLITICAL SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE DEMOCRACY TEORÍA POLÍTICA GOBERNABILIDAD DEMOCRACIA SISTEMA POLÍTICO |