GAME OF REGIMES: A GAME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE MODERN CONTRACTUAL STATE
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| Автор: | |
|---|---|
| Формат: | artículo original |
| Статус: | Versión publicada |
| Дата публикации: | 2021 |
| Описание: | This article argues that democracy, as well as non-democratic regimes, share hierarchies as models of governance (conflict resolution mechanisms) in the process of building a modern contractual state. Game theory is used as a methodology to analyze the works of Hobbes and Machiavelli, defending that both proposals describe the same phenomenon but at different stages, with the objective of contributing to the explanation of the current crisis of democracy. To this end, a new model that integrates Von Neumann’s expectedutility function with a variant of Selten’s discount rate to refine equilibria, is developed. It is concluded that it is not the governance model, but the efficiency of the State to manage the conflict that determines the consolidation (or dismantling) of the contractual regime. |
| Страна: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Институт: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Язык: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/45489 |
| Online-ссылка: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/sociales/article/view/45489 |
| Ключевое слово: | POLITICAL THEORY POLITICAL SYSTEMS GOVERNANCE DEMOCRACY TEORÍA POLÍTICA GOBERNABILIDAD DEMOCRACIA SISTEMA POLÍTICO |