Can Fregeans have ‘I’-thoughts?
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| লেখক: | , |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | artículo original |
| বর্তমান অবস্থা: | Versión publicada |
| প্রকাশনার তারিখ: | 2015 |
| বিবরন: | We examine how Frege’s contrast between identity judgments of the forms “a=a” vs. “a=b” would fare in the special case where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are complex mental representations, and ‘a’ stands for an introspected ‘I’-thought. We first argue that the Fregean treatment of I-thoughts entails that they are what we call “one-shot thoughts”: they can only be thought once. This has the surprising consequence that no instance of the “a=a” form of judgment in this specific case comes out true, let alone a priori true. This further reinforces Glezakos’s objections against the set-up of Frege’s puzzle, while also raising what we think is an acute problem for Fregeans, insofar as I-thought (and indexical thinking more generally), understood in their way, turns out to be incompatible with some basic features of rationality. |
| দেশ: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| প্রতিষ্ঠান: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| ভাষা: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21322 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21322 |
| মুখ্য শব্দ: | i-thoughts token-reflexivity one-shot thoughts paradox rationality pensamientos del yo reflexividad del ejemplar pensamientos de un disparo paradoja racionalidad |