La cognición perceptual. Creencia y razones epistémicas según Leibniz
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| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Médium: | artículo original |
| Stav: | Versión publicada |
| Datum vydání: | 2014 |
| Popis: | In this paper I analize Leibniz’s view on sense perception (sensus) in his middle years as an epistemological doctrine in which he combines the demands of external constraint (receptivity) and epistemic justification (normativity). The view is then related to his strategies to refute skeptic arguments concerning the justification of perceptual judgments. |
| Země: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Instituce: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Jazyk: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/13143 |
| On-line přístup: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/13143 |
| Klíčové slovo: | leibniz perception skepticism belief justification percepción escepticismo creencia justificación |