Normal Games and the Evolution of Culture

 

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Bibliografski detalji
Autor: Acuña, Osvaldo
Format: artículo original
Status:Versión publicada
Datum izdanja:2010
Opis:We prove that the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies corresponds to the concept of evolutionarily stable in Cultural Evolution. We use replicator dynamics to prove this fact.
Zemlja:Portal de Revistas UCR
Institucija:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UCR
Jezik:Español
OAI Identifier:oai:portal.revistas.ucr.ac.cr:article/8606
Online pristup:https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/reconomicas/article/view/8606
Ključna riječ:Juegos
Evolución cultural
Games
Cultural evolution