Normal Games and the Evolution of Culture

 

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Detaylı Bibliyografya
Yazar: Acuña, Osvaldo
Materyal Türü: artículo original
Durum:Versión publicada
Yayın Tarihi:2010
Diğer Bilgiler:We prove that the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies corresponds to the concept of evolutionarily stable in Cultural Evolution. We use replicator dynamics to prove this fact.
Ülke:Portal de Revistas UCR
Kurum:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UCR
Dil:Español
OAI Identifier:oai:portal.revistas.ucr.ac.cr:article/8606
Online Erişim:https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/reconomicas/article/view/8606
Anahtar Kelime:Juegos
Evolución cultural
Games
Cultural evolution