El argumento de la indispensabilidad y el ficcionalismo de Balaguer
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| Συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2009 |
| Περιγραφή: | My main purpose in this article consist in analyzing two objections, thrown by Balaguer against Quine`s and Putnam`s indispensability argument. First I present the argument, under Quine`s philosophical framework, and classify objections against it in three main categories, one of them leading to fictionalism. The next section contains a revision about the particular form this philosophical current acquires in Balaguer`s works, to conclude by mentioning the relevant issues left unsolved, concerning the applicability of mathematics. Also mentioned is how this objection could be solved, adopting some of his adversaries premises. At the end I considerer a further objection presented by Balaguer to the indispensability argument, noting, to conclude, that although serious, nonetheless it is not conclusive. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Γλώσσα: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www.una.ac.cr:article/4099 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/praxis/article/view/4099 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | Indispensabilidad Quine Putnam. Indispensability |