Humor as a Dispositional Property: Toward a Metaphysical Grounding from Analytic Functionalism
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| Συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2026 |
| Περιγραφή: | The article argues that humor is not a mental state in the strict sense but a dispositional property of certain mental states, activated by the incongruity between the expected representational content and the object's actual presentation. Classical theories (superiority, relief, and incongruity) are critically reconstructed to expose their explanatory limits, and Lewis's analytic functionalism is deployed within a non-reductive physicalist framework. This grounding accounts for humor's contextual variability by appeal to the agent's cognitive structures, and it opens projections toward the ethics of humor and the clinical study of its impairments. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Γλώσσα: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23020 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/praxis/article/view/23020 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | humor dispositional property incongruity analytic functionalism philosophy of mind propiedad disposicional incongruencia funcionalismo analítico filosofía de la mente |