Collusion analysis for the prospective electricity auction market in Costa Rica.
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| বর্তমান অবস্থা: | Versión publicada |
| প্রকাশনার তারিখ: | 2026 |
| বিবরন: | Considering the potential opening of the Costa Rican electricity market through laws aimed at replacing ICE’s centralized planning model with an electricity auction market, it is essential to examine the collusion scenarios that could arise given the market conditions and the current behavior of its economic agents. To this end, this article utilizes game theory and existing empirical evidence. It concludes that there are scenarios where there is a risk of materializing collusive anti-competitive practices, which would lead to inefficient outcomes for users. |
| দেশ: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| প্রতিষ্ঠান: | Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| ভাষা: | Español Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23138 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/politicaeconomica/article/view/23138 |
| মুখ্য শব্দ: | collusion electricity auctions game theory public policy colusión electricidad subastas teoría de juegos regulación |