Collusion analysis for the prospective electricity auction market in Costa Rica.

 

সংরক্ষণ করুন:
গ্রন্থ-পঞ্জীর বিবরন
লেখক: Guillén Pérez, Sofía
বর্তমান অবস্থা:Versión publicada
প্রকাশনার তারিখ:2026
বিবরন:Considering the potential opening of the Costa Rican electricity market through laws aimed at replacing ICE’s centralized planning model with an electricity auction market, it is essential to examine the collusion scenarios that could arise given the market conditions and the current behavior of its economic agents. To this end, this article utilizes game theory and existing empirical evidence. It concludes that there are scenarios where there is a risk of materializing collusive anti-competitive practices, which would lead to inefficient outcomes for users.
দেশ:Portal de Revistas UNA
প্রতিষ্ঠান:Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UNA
ভাষা:Español
Inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23138
অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন:https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/politicaeconomica/article/view/23138
মুখ্য শব্দ:collusion
electricity
auctions
game theory
public policy
colusión
electricidad
subastas
teoría de juegos
regulación