Collusion analysis for the prospective electricity auction market in Costa Rica.

 

שמור ב:
מידע ביבליוגרפי
מחבר: Guillén Pérez, Sofía
סטטוס:Versión publicada
Fecha de Publicación:2026
תיאור:Considering the potential opening of the Costa Rican electricity market through laws aimed at replacing ICE’s centralized planning model with an electricity auction market, it is essential to examine the collusion scenarios that could arise given the market conditions and the current behavior of its economic agents. To this end, this article utilizes game theory and existing empirical evidence. It concludes that there are scenarios where there is a risk of materializing collusive anti-competitive practices, which would lead to inefficient outcomes for users.
País:Portal de Revistas UNA
מוסד:Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UNA
שפה:Español
Inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23138
גישה מקוונת:https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/politicaeconomica/article/view/23138
מילת מפתח:collusion
electricity
auctions
game theory
public policy
colusión
electricidad
subastas
teoría de juegos
regulación