Collusion analysis for the prospective electricity auction market in Costa Rica.

 

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書誌詳細
著者: Guillén Pérez, Sofía
状態:Versión publicada
出版日付:2026
その他の書誌記述:Considering the potential opening of the Costa Rican electricity market through laws aimed at replacing ICE’s centralized planning model with an electricity auction market, it is essential to examine the collusion scenarios that could arise given the market conditions and the current behavior of its economic agents. To this end, this article utilizes game theory and existing empirical evidence. It concludes that there are scenarios where there is a risk of materializing collusive anti-competitive practices, which would lead to inefficient outcomes for users.
国:Portal de Revistas UNA
機関:Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UNA
言語:Español
Inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23138
オンライン・アクセス:https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/politicaeconomica/article/view/23138
キーワード:collusion
electricity
auctions
game theory
public policy
colusión
electricidad
subastas
teoría de juegos
regulación