Collusion analysis for the prospective electricity auction market in Costa Rica.

 

Đã lưu trong:
Chi tiết về thư mục
Tác giả: Guillén Pérez, Sofía
Trạng thái:Versión publicada
Ngày xuất bản:2026
Miêu tả:Considering the potential opening of the Costa Rican electricity market through laws aimed at replacing ICE’s centralized planning model with an electricity auction market, it is essential to examine the collusion scenarios that could arise given the market conditions and the current behavior of its economic agents. To this end, this article utilizes game theory and existing empirical evidence. It concludes that there are scenarios where there is a risk of materializing collusive anti-competitive practices, which would lead to inefficient outcomes for users.
Quốc gia:Portal de Revistas UNA
Tổ chức giáo dục:Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UNA
Ngôn ngữ:Español
Inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/23138
Truy cập trực tuyến:https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/politicaeconomica/article/view/23138
Từ khóa:collusion
electricity
auctions
game theory
public policy
colusión
electricidad
subastas
teoría de juegos
regulación