Crítica de Leibniz a las definiciones genéticas
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| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | artículo original |
| Status: | Versión publicada |
| Data wydania: | 2014 |
| Opis: | Hobbes, Spinoza, and Tschirnhaus consider genetic definitions as the only causal definitions and the only ones suitable for scientific knowledge. Leibniz also stresses the epistemological function of real definitions, but disagrees with Spinoza and Tschirnhaus about whether genetic (or causal) definitions are the only real definitions. Leibniz sought applicability of the definitional method not only in the realm of essences, but also in the field of existences, where the a priori analysis of concepts is replaced by the use of sensory experience, which allows us to gradually approach to the verification of our rational inferences. |
| Kraj: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Instytucja: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Język: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/13115 |
| Dostęp online: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/13115 |
| Słowo kluczowe: | genetic definition analysis spinoza tschirnhaus leibniz definición genética análisis |