No es que me hayas mentido lo que más me conmueve, sino que yo jamás te volveré a creer: A propósito de la mentira como problema moral
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2017 |
| Περιγραφή: | This paper defends a central claim: Lie is powerful and persistent in culture –against all moral rules that intend its annihilation– because it finds its strongest root in the basic drifts of human beings, scil.: pleasure, love and hate. In addition, this article develops some kind of taxonomy of lie and its diverse theories. It is delineated, in this paper, some kind of “realist Ethics” concerning the topic. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Γλώσσα: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/28267 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/28267 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | Lie Values Truth Ethics Meta- Ethics Law Self-Deceit |