Cognitive Value and Natural Language Proper Names
Đã lưu trong:
| Tác giả: | |
|---|---|
| Định dạng: | artículo original |
| Trạng thái: | Versión publicada |
| Ngày xuất bản: | 2015 |
| Miêu tả: | In her “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?”, Stavroula Glezakos claims that Frege cannot pose his puzzle without appealing to something like the theoretical notion of Sinn and so the so-called puzzle does not affect non- Fregeans and Fregeans should not be puzzled by it since it is their framework that both generates and explains it. But contrary to what Glezakos thinks, I argue in this paper that both Fregeans and non-Fregeans alike face a puzzle about true identity statements concerning proper names that can and should be posed given some idiosyncrasies of natural languages. Indeed, it seems that a successful theory of natural language proper names must appeal to Sinn-like entities to capture cognitive differences in true identity statements. |
| Quốc gia: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Tổ chức giáo dục: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21333 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21333 |
| Từ khóa: | frege identity statements cognitive value proper names natural language enunciados de identidad valor cognitivo nombres propios lenguaje natural |