Informativeness and multiple senses
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| লেখক: | |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | artículo original |
| বর্তমান অবস্থা: | Versión publicada |
| প্রকাশনার তারিখ: | 2015 |
| বিবরন: | Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers, an issue that, in my view, Frege should have puzzled more about. |
| দেশ: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| প্রতিষ্ঠান: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| ভাষা: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21314 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21314 |
| মুখ্য শব্দ: | names informative identities multiple senses reference frege nombres identidades informativas múltiples sentidos referencia |