Informativeness and multiple senses
Gorde:
| Egilea: | |
|---|---|
| Formatua: | artículo original |
| Egoera: | Versión publicada |
| Argitaratze data: | 2015 |
| Deskribapena: | Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers, an issue that, in my view, Frege should have puzzled more about. |
| Herria: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Erakundea: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Hizkuntza: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21314 |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21314 |
| Gako-hitza: | names informative identities multiple senses reference frege nombres identidades informativas múltiples sentidos referencia |