Informativeness and multiple senses
שמור ב:
| מחבר: | |
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| פורמט: | artículo original |
| סטטוס: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2015 |
| תיאור: | Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers, an issue that, in my view, Frege should have puzzled more about. |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| מוסד: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| שפה: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21314 |
| גישה מקוונת: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21314 |
| מילת מפתח: | names informative identities multiple senses reference frege nombres identidades informativas múltiples sentidos referencia |