Informativeness and multiple senses
Đã lưu trong:
| Tác giả: | |
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| Định dạng: | artículo original |
| Trạng thái: | Versión publicada |
| Ngày xuất bản: | 2015 |
| Miêu tả: | Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers, an issue that, in my view, Frege should have puzzled more about. |
| Quốc gia: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Tổ chức giáo dục: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21314 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21314 |
| Từ khóa: | names informative identities multiple senses reference frege nombres identidades informativas múltiples sentidos referencia |