Revisiting “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?”
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| Tác giả: | |
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| Định dạng: | artículo original |
| Trạng thái: | Versión publicada |
| Ngày xuất bản: | 2015 |
| Miêu tả: | In this paper, I revisit themes from my paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?” I begin by discussing our connection to the proper names that we use, and I explain why I continue to think that the epistemic status of true name-containing identity sentences is not puzzling. I conclude with some remarks about why I think that adherents of the direct reference conception of names should accept this position. |
| Quốc gia: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Tổ chức giáo dục: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21313 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21313 |
| Từ khóa: | frege’s puzzle proper names reference saul kripke david kaplan puzzle de frege nombres propios referencia |