Business Elites in Panama: Networks, Electoral Contributions, and Revolving Doors
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| Autori: | , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | artículo original |
| Status: | Versión publicada |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2023 |
| Descrizione: | Panama is a particular case in which strong and consolidated regulatory and democratic institutions coexist along with high corruption and state capture. To understand this case, this article analyzes elite’s sources of power: income control, business cohesion, contributions to electoral campaigns and revolving doors. The results show that in Panama there is a very high income concentration together with low fiscal progressivity, cohesion of a small set of family business groups, coordinated contributions to a presidential candidate and appointments of businesspeople to strategic government positions. |
| Stato: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Istituzione: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Lingua: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/55415 |
| Accesso online: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/anuario/article/view/55415 |
| Keyword: | economic elites corruption business-state relations network analysis inequality élites económicas corrupción relaciones empresariales-estatales análisis de redes desigualdad |