Contrafácticos: ¿una dieta limitada de ejemplos?
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Μορφή: | artículo original |
| Κατάσταση: | Versión publicada |
| Ημερομηνία έκδοσης: | 2015 |
| Περιγραφή: | The justification for alternative calculi based on particular cases that seem to conflict with the truth-table of the standard conditional is here analyzed. We advocate a more thorough examination of oft-repeated examples and a search for different kinds of new ones. Leibniz’s interpretation of legal statements as probable hypotheticals is mentioned as a model for the type of work proposed in this paper. Although several kinds of conditionals are usually distinguished in logic textbooks, counterfactuals are almost always placed together as a single category. We propose here that several kinds of counterfactuals can be distinguished from a logical perspective; some of them are mentioned. |
| Χώρα: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Ίδρυμα: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Γλώσσα: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21336 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21336 |
| Λέξη-Κλειδί : | lógica modal enunciados legales condicionales leibniz contrafácticos modal logic legal statements conditionals counterfactuals |