A simple theory of proper names
Guardado en:
| Údar: | |
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| Formáid: | artículo original |
| Stádas: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2015 |
| Cur Síos: | In this essay, I address the following question posed by Glezakos (after Kaplan): What determines the form of a namecontaining identity statement? I argue that uses of names are determined by the specific names uttered and the presence (or absence) of coco-referential intentions of the speaker. This explains why utterances of the form a=a are uninformative or knowable a priori, more generally than utterances of the form a=b. My approach has the additional benefit of providing an account of empty names. |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institiúid: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Teanga: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21328 |
| Rochtain Ar Líne: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21328 |
| Palabra clave: | proper name identity a priori coco-reference nombre propio identidad cocorreferencia |