A simple theory of proper names
Bewaard in:
| Auteur: | |
|---|---|
| Formaat: | artículo original |
| Status: | Versión publicada |
| Publicatiedatum: | 2015 |
| Omschrijving: | In this essay, I address the following question posed by Glezakos (after Kaplan): What determines the form of a namecontaining identity statement? I argue that uses of names are determined by the specific names uttered and the presence (or absence) of coco-referential intentions of the speaker. This explains why utterances of the form a=a are uninformative or knowable a priori, more generally than utterances of the form a=b. My approach has the additional benefit of providing an account of empty names. |
| Land: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Instelling: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Taal: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21328 |
| Online toegang: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21328 |
| Keyword: | proper name identity a priori coco-reference nombre propio identidad cocorreferencia |