Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos
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| Autore: | |
|---|---|
| Natura: | artículo original |
| Status: | Versión publicada |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2015 |
| Descrizione: | Glezakos’s (2009) argument that Frege’s puzzle cannot motivate Fregean theories is that stating it requires presupposing a Fregean view, and hence it can be ignored by non-Fregeans. I respond by showing that the contrast needed for Frege’s cases requires only a notion of internal or de iure coreference, which pretheoretically does not presuppose Fregean commitments. |
| Stato: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Istituzione: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Lingua: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21324 |
| Accesso online: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21324 |
| Keyword: | frege’s puzzle de iure co-reference sense identity validity puzzle de frege correferencia de iure sentido identidad validez |