Understanding Anaphoric Dependence: A Reply to Glezakos
保存先:
| 著者: | |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | artículo original |
| 状態: | Versión publicada |
| 出版日付: | 2015 |
| その他の書誌記述: | Glezakos’s (2009) argument that Frege’s puzzle cannot motivate Fregean theories is that stating it requires presupposing a Fregean view, and hence it can be ignored by non-Fregeans. I respond by showing that the contrast needed for Frege’s cases requires only a notion of internal or de iure coreference, which pretheoretically does not presuppose Fregean commitments. |
| 国: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| 機関: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| 言語: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21324 |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21324 |
| キーワード: | frege’s puzzle de iure co-reference sense identity validity puzzle de frege correferencia de iure sentido identidad validez |