Deliberative democracy and political desagreement: Cohen versus Rawls
Guardado en:
| Údar: | |
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| Formáid: | artículo original |
| Stádas: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2022 |
| Cur Síos: | This article deals with some of the main conceptual elements of the deliberative democracy, of the american philosopher Joshua Cohen. The objective is to contrast his answer to the theoretical need of legitimation of the political disagreement, with the limitations imposed to the exercise of the public reason, in the conception of justice as fairness, proposed by his mentor John Rawls. The ideal of a deliberative democracy, proposed by Cohen, finds in the principle of deliberative inclusion mutual presupposition of the the public autonomy and the private autonomy of citizens, resulting in a politically legitimate disagreement, and a calling for a radicalization of the democratic ideal. Thus, the deliberative democracy of Cohen express a theoretical formulation complementary of the justice as fairness of Rawls. Methodologically, this article develops a contrast between some of the main theretical and conceptual elements of both philosophers. |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institiúid: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Teanga: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:archivo.portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/53302 |
| Rochtain Ar Líne: | https://archivo.revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/estudios/article/view/53302 |
| Palabra clave: | deliberative democracy; principle of deliberative inclusion; public reason; political autonomy; political disagreement democracia deliberativa; principio de inclusión deliberativa; razón pública; autonomía política; desacuerdo político |