The Argument from Marginal Cases: Moral Degradation or Ableist Bias?
Gardado en:
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo original |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Data de Publicación: | 2025 |
| Descripción: | According to Peter Singer’s perspective, there are marginal human beings. However, the alleged marginality in this argument arises from positioning disabled individuals within a hierarchy of cognitive abilities, under the pretext of the capacities they lack. This is what I seek to challenge by questioning the notion of marginality in the argument, which frames disability as misfortune. To do so, I review some of the most significant critiques of the argument of marginal cases and propose an approach rooted in critical disability studies, through the lens of «ableist bias» |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institución: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Idioma: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.revistas.ucr.ac.cr:article/1586 |
| Acceso en liña: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/rfilosofia/article/view/1586 |
| Palabra crave: | argument from marginal cases animal ethics ableism disability argumento de los casos marginales etica animal capacitismo discapacidad |