Business Elites in Panama: Networks, Electoral Contributions, and Revolving Doors
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| 著者: | , |
|---|---|
| フォーマット: | artículo original |
| 状態: | Versión publicada |
| 出版日付: | 2023 |
| その他の書誌記述: | Panama is a particular case in which strong and consolidated regulatory and democratic institutions coexist along with high corruption and state capture. To understand this case, this article analyzes elite’s sources of power: income control, business cohesion, contributions to electoral campaigns and revolving doors. The results show that in Panama there is a very high income concentration together with low fiscal progressivity, cohesion of a small set of family business groups, coordinated contributions to a presidential candidate and appointments of businesspeople to strategic government positions. |
| 国: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| 機関: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| 言語: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/55415 |
| オンライン･アクセス: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/anuario/article/view/55415 |
| キーワード: | economic elites corruption business-state relations network analysis inequality élites económicas corrupción relaciones empresariales-estatales análisis de redes desigualdad |