Business Elites in Panama: Networks, Electoral Contributions, and Revolving Doors
সংরক্ষণ করুন:
| লেখক: | , |
|---|---|
| বিন্যাস: | artículo original |
| বর্তমান অবস্থা: | Versión publicada |
| প্রকাশনার তারিখ: | 2023 |
| বিবরন: | Panama is a particular case in which strong and consolidated regulatory and democratic institutions coexist along with high corruption and state capture. To understand this case, this article analyzes elite’s sources of power: income control, business cohesion, contributions to electoral campaigns and revolving doors. The results show that in Panama there is a very high income concentration together with low fiscal progressivity, cohesion of a small set of family business groups, coordinated contributions to a presidential candidate and appointments of businesspeople to strategic government positions. |
| দেশ: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| প্রতিষ্ঠান: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| ভাষা: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/55415 |
| অনলাইন ব্যবহার করুন: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/anuario/article/view/55415 |
| মুখ্য শব্দ: | economic elites corruption business-state relations network analysis inequality élites económicas corrupción relaciones empresariales-estatales análisis de redes desigualdad |