Objectivity and Epistemic Injustice
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| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Médium: | artículo original |
| Stav: | Versión publicada |
| Datum vydání: | 2026 |
| Popis: | This article explores the relationship between objectivity and epistemic injustice. It aims to question the guiding principles of scientific objectivity through criteria of epistemic justice, seeking to identify whether these principles create conflicts for objectivity. To this end, discourse analysis has been employed, focusing primarily on the construction of the notion of objectivity and the conditions of epistemic injustice established by Miranda Fricker. The text presents an historical approach to the conceptualization of objectivity, followed by an introduction to the characteristics of epistemic injustice, contrasting these with cases and critiques developed within various non-classical epistemic perspectives. The article argues for the existence of a structural epistemic bias that implies conditions under which epistemic injustice is not only possible or occasional but also appears as a habitual manifestation in knowledge production processes. |
| Země: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Instituce: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Jazyk: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.revistas.ucr.ac.cr:article/6922 |
| On-line přístup: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/rfilosofia/article/view/6922 |
| Klíčové slovo: | Epistemic injustice objectivity structural injustice epistemologies of the South structural epistemic bias Injusticia epistémica objetividad injusticia estructural epistemologías del sur sesgo epistémico estructural |