Decision-Making Design in the Appointment of Heads of Oversight Institutions in Costa Rica: The Case of the Ombudsman’s Office
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف: | |
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| التنسيق: | artículo original |
| الحالة: | Versión publicada |
| تاريخ النشر: | 2009 |
| الوصف: | The appointment of the leaders of political control organs, is critical to the profile of a democratic political system for the functioning of its institutions. It is imperative that the design rules may in advance generate confidence about the relevance, correctness and appropriateness in the respective decision-making model. This article is a product of the research “The modeling of governance based on the Theory of Games”, inscribed on the “Vicerrectoría de Investigación” at the University of Costa Rica (213-A6-015), which attempted to model decision situations based on game theory. In particular, this article makes an analysis of the proposed institutional design that ultimately culminated in the choice of medic Quesada Tristán, at the head of the “Defensoría de los Habitantes” in 2005. |
| البلد: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| المؤسسة: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| اللغة: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.revistas.ucr.ac.cr:article/9000 |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/reconomicas/article/view/9000 |
| كلمة مفتاحية: | Teoría de juego Votación Estrategia Control Partidos políticos Defensor de los habitantes Games theory Vote Strategy Political parties Ombudsman |