Saber absoluto, saber del límite desazón, olvido y contingencia en la Fenomenología del Espíritu

 

Đã lưu trong:
Chi tiết về thư mục
Nhiều tác giả: Rossi, María José, Muñiz, Marcelo
Định dạng: artículo original
Trạng thái:Versión publicada
Ngày xuất bản:2008
Miêu tả:This paper takes position against the traditional readings of Hegel, who make from the absolute knowing the perfect identity of thinking and being. We sustain, on the contrary, with Zizek, that the true absolute knowing is the consciousness of failure, and that the final consciousness recognizes its being in the “free fortuitous happening”. Difficulties emerge from ignorance of the different levels that proposes the text: the one of consciousness and the one of us; where “us” is not a supra-consciousness but its criterion (which consists in putting retrospectively necessity where there is not) that varies along its phenomenological course, as it does consciousness. That is because the subject is not seen by Hegel as substrate but it is seen-through (anticipating Lacan) as fault, split. In this manner, the absolute knowing does not represent a close but an opening; it is the knowing the limit.
Quốc gia:Portal de Revistas UNA
Tổ chức giáo dục:Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UNA
Ngôn ngữ:Español
OAI Identifier:oai:www.revistas.una.ac.cr:article/5080
Truy cập trực tuyến:https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/praxis/article/view/5080
Từ khóa:Hegel
fenomenology
absolute knowing
Fenomenología
saber absoluto.