Alternate possibilities and epistemic vices on moral responsibility in times of pandemic
Wedi'i Gadw mewn:
| Awdur: | |
|---|---|
| Fformat: | artículo original |
| Statws: | Versión publicada |
| Dyddiad Cyhoeddi: | 2020 |
| Disgrifiad: | Some debates in the academic field take on real meaning in concrete situations, especially in the face of certain realities. In the present pandemic scenario, the notion of moral responsibility is of particular interest. It will be reviewed on the basis of the framework provided by the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), although I will not venture into the vast dimension of that context. The purpose of this article is to explore, from the above background, and in the light of the current events, what may alter the perception and understanding of facts to the point of interfering with proper knowledge, disorienting reasonable choice, and even misleading our ideas of moral responsibility. It will be suggested that advances in the field of vice epistemology can assist in the explanation of this phenomenon. |
| Gwlad: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Sefydliad: | Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UNA |
| Iaith: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.www.una.ac.cr:article/14685 |
| Mynediad Ar-lein: | https://www.revistas.una.ac.cr/index.php/praxis/article/view/14685 |
| Allweddair: | moral responsibility principle of alternate possibilities epistemic vices vice epistemology pandemic responsabilidad moral principio de posibilidades alternativas vicios epistémicos epistemología del vicio pandemia |