Hospital decentralization law: effects, limits, and discretion in the quasi-market scenario in Costa Rica
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| Nhiều tác giả: | , , |
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| Định dạng: | artículo original |
| Trạng thái: | Versión publicada |
| Ngày xuất bản: | 2024 |
| Miêu tả: | This text addresses the historical process that implements a management model for Costa Rican social security based on the principles of a quasi-market scenario. It discusses the tensions surrounding the implementation of competition between public and private providers, under the assumption that this generates efficiency. The methodological effort included the review of primary and secondary sources, the construction of interdisciplinary spaces for discussion, and the review of the mentioned scenario. Discretion, as an administrative component, generates tensions and contradictions that accompany the reform over two decades, as a corollary, and has a direct impact on the social determinant of the health-disease process: the population's access and the public interest that should prevail. |
| Quốc gia: | Portal de Revistas UNED |
| Tổ chức giáo dục: | Universidad Estatal a Distancia |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UNED |
| Ngôn ngữ: | Español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:revistas.investiga.uned.ac.cr:article/5454 |
| Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://revistas.uned.ac.cr/index.php/espiga/article/view/5454 |
| Từ khóa: | Sistema de salud Modelo de gestión Competencia económica Eficiencia Interés público Economic competition Efficiency Health system Management model Public interest |