Revisiting “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?”

 

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Autor: Glezakos, Stavroula
Médium: artículo original
Stav:Versión publicada
Datum vydání:2015
Popis:In this paper, I revisit themes from my paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle?” I begin by discussing our connection to the proper names that we use, and I explain why I continue to think that the epistemic status of true name-containing identity sentences is not puzzling. I conclude with some remarks about why I think that adherents of the direct reference conception of names should accept this position.
Země:Portal de Revistas UCR
Instituce:Universidad de Costa Rica
Repositorio:Portal de Revistas UCR
Jazyk:Inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21313
On-line přístup:https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21313
Access Level:acceso abierto
Klíčové slovo:frege’s puzzle
proper names
reference
saul kripke
david kaplan
puzzle de frege
nombres propios
referencia