Frege’s Puzzle: Much Ado about Nothing?
Guardado en:
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo original |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de Publicación: | 2015 |
| Descripción: | In her paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle”, Stavroula Glezakos argues for the claim that, unless one presupposes the theoretical notion of sense, there is no in-principle epistemic divide between sentences of the form “a=a” and “a=b”. It would follow that Frege’s puzzle cannot be used to argue in favour of senses, as Frege has done, on pain of circularity. Here I argue that a criterion of name identity based on the notion of explicit co-reference can be specified that does not presuppose the notion of sense. I show how such criterion is plausibly implicitly at work in setting up the puzzle, and that it can be deployed to rescue Frege from the accusation of circularity. |
| País: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Institución: | Universidad de Costa Rica |
| Repositorio: | Portal de Revistas UCR |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:portal.ucr.ac.cr:article/21329 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/filosofia/article/view/21329 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | frege’s puzzle co-reference names identity logical form puzzle de frege correferencia nombres identidad forma lógica |